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NETWORK OPTIMIZATION WITH DYNAMIC 
TRAFFIC INFORMATION AND TOLLING: A 
PROBABILISTIC MODEL AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 
LEURENT Fabien1, NGUYEN Thai Phu, 
Université Paris-Est / LVMT / Ecole des Ponts ParisTech, France 
ABSTRACT 
A model is developed for traffic network subject to recurrent congestion and incidental 
disturbances on link travel times with the presence of dynamic traffic information, and two 
classes of users respectively informed and uninformed. This traffic assignment model is bi-
layered every informed user chooses his route for the short run in any circumstance, 
whereas every non-informed user chooses his route on for the long run an average basis. 
 
In addition to to dynamic traffic information service, congestion pricing with various tolling 
strategies like no-tolling, flat tolling or dynamic tolling is also integrated to the model. This 
model allows us to analyze the combined operation of two traffic demand management tools 
as well as the interplays between these tools with recurrent congestion, non-recurrent 
congestion and users’ behaviors. 
 
The model is applied for a two-parallel-link network with one O-D pair and linear travel time 
functions and additive random disturbances. Analytical formulae and numerical investigation 
show that the benefits from such combined traffic management system split into three parts: 
benefit from information and benefit from congestion pricing and benefit from joint operation. 
The complementarities are highly efficient at high equipment rate with dynamic tolling. 
 
Keywords: Dynamic Traffic Information; Multi-class Traffic Assignment; Bi-layer Equilibrium; 
User Optimum; System Optimum; Congestion pricing. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Traffic demand management tools 
In a road network, the congestion delays include the recurrent delays due to exceed 
demand, determined by the flow pattern and the laws of traffic, and the non-recurrent 
congestion delays due to incidents, accidents or other random events, such weather hazard. 
To tackle congestion, the network operator can avail itself of a wide set of tools and 
resources including long run capacity planning, medium run operations planning and short 
run or even real-time by dynamic adaptation of traffic signals, of the local limit speed, of the 
fare of HOT lanes etc. Traffic management also includes demand management through 
quality setting, pricing and information provision which are closely related with traffic 
information services. 
Road guidance by traffic information systems 
Traffic information services enjoy constant development in a variety of forms: these include 
network maps, fixed road signs and variable message signs (VMS), traffic radio etc. 
Moreover, traffic information services by the telephone or the internet, as well as guidance 
services based on onboard devices provide advanced information which is customized to the 
individual needs. Actually the user chooses his route and/or departure time on the basis of 
experience and the information sources that are available to him (e.g. see Miles and Chen, 
2004; Leurent, 2004). 
 
Due to stochastic characteristics of the non-recurrent causes, non-recurrent delays can not 
be forecasted by the individual user. Thanks to the advancement in technologies, including 
computer, communication and technical data processing, the network operator has been 
able to detect disturbances, to measure and even to anticipate traffic conditions so as to 
better react to occurrences. Furthermore, information about traffic conditions can be 
communicated to road users. The disposal of sharp information enables the road user to 
react in real-time to traffic disturbances for improving his decision making. At the network 
level, it is hoped that benefits from traffic information services are not limited to an individual 
gain but also extended to system-wide benefits since individually optimal decisions contribute 
to improve the whole network performance. 
Congestion pricing as traffic management tool 
Road pricing, as an effective means of both managing road traffic demand and raising 
additional revenue for road construction, has been studied extensively by both transportation 
researchers and economists. Thanks to the development of electronic road pricing 
technologies (ERP), the implementation of congestion pricing has become more and more 
feasible. Nowadays, various tolling systems are deployed throughout the world, such as: 
cordon tolling is deployed in some congested urban areas, e.g. London, Singapore, on trail in 
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Stockholm and on project in New York City, flat tolling or variable-time-step tolling is 
deployed on numerous highways or freeway sections, e.g. the project EUROTOLL in Europe 
(OECD, 2002) or HOT-lane application in the United States (see information in the reviews of 
Lemoine, 2009; Ubbels, 2009). By introducing a toll and influencing the road users’ decision 
(destination, mode, and route or departure time choice), it is hoped that travel demand is 
better distributed in the time dimension or/and also in the space dimension, so individual gain 
and the social welfare can be improved 
Interplays between traffic information and congestion pricing 
A priori, dynamic traffic information services could offer significant benefits in terms of 
improving individual trip experience, in particular with non-recurrent congestion which cause 
30%-50% total delay volume on highway (OECD, 1998). Nevertheless, some studies have 
demonstrated that as result of drivers’ responses to more information, adverse effects and 
negative externalities may arise on the system, e.g. Ben-Akiva, De Palma et al. (1991); 
Zhang and Verhoef (2006) and confirmed by one of our works, Leurent and Nguyen (2010). 
This happens because when drivers take their trip decisions don’t take into account the 
external costs that they produce on the other drivers and on the overall system. 
 
It is important to address the joint implementation of both traffic management tools over a 
common network because traffic information services and congestion tolling have 
technological complementarities; both tools are used for a similar kind of road infrastructure 
and based on the information technologies. In addition, a dynamic traffic information service 
is able to provide information about toll which depends on the actual level of congestion, so 
that road users are perfectly aware of their private cost including social optimal congestion 
tolling. 
 
Therefore, it is desirable to analyze the interaction between the two systems because 
congestion tolling may influence the operation of traveler information as well as the benefits 
derived from traveler information and vice versa 
1.2. Related literature review 
Analysis of traveler information impacts 
Analytical approach, the provision of traveler information makes a complex issue of which 
objective, contents, target, diffusion medium, equipment type, equipment rate etc. In 
particular the interplay of the congestion sources and physical laws with the provision of 
dynamic traffic information calls for a model, useful to analyze and simulate the phenomena 
hence to gain a better understanding. 
 
The distinction of congestion sources and their interplay with dynamic traffic information has 
been addressed correctly for the choice of departure time by Noland, Small et al. (1998); 
Leurent (2001, 2004), although the analytical approach does not include the feedback of user 
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re-timing due to congestion. However, concerning route choice, dynamic simulation in the 
2000s, e.g. Lo and Szeto (2004) has taken the same line as static simulation in the 1990s, 
Al-deek and Kanafani (1989); Van Vuren and Watling (1991); Maher and Hughes (1995) by 
assuming that informed users would perceive a mean travel time, whereas uninformed users 
would experience disturbed travel times. In fact, this stands exactly opposite to the essence 
of dynamic disturbances and information since dynamic traffic information reflects eventual 
network disturbances. 
 
Network disturbances, in particular the relationship between disturbances and dynamic 
information are still mis-modeled with few analytical contributions. Most of works on this 
issue are on the basis of numerical simulation, e.g. Al-Deek, Khattak et al. (1998); Hu, Wang 
et al. (2005); Levinson, Gillen et al. (1999); and Levinson (2003) which provides a limited 
representation of disturbed cases and also a limited analytical understanding. 
Optimal congestion pricing 
“Optimal tolling” has been largely considered by transportation economists. Three main 
issues are: which goals should be fixed, i.e. tolling regime, which part of the traffic network 
should be tolled, i.e. tolling configuration, and what toll must be applied at a given period of 
time, i.e. the tolling schedule. 
 
The father of congestion pricing is Vickrey who introduced firstly the principal “charges 
should reflect as closely as possible the marginal social cost of each trip in terms of the 
impacts on others”- (Vickrey, 1967). The system optimum can be obtained if on each link, 
every road user is charged at the amount of marginal social cost (first-best). 
 
Since the toll implementation on all road sections is difficultly feasible, a number of works 
have been targeted contribute to the issues of where and how much toll could be 
implemented within a limited number of predefined links (second-best). In static simulation, 
the most comprehensive contributions on second-best tolling should be Vany and Saving 
(1980); Verhoef, Nijkamp et al. (1996); de Palma and Lindsey (2000); Verhoef (2002a, b); 
and Zhang and Verhoef (2006) among others. 
 
As regards dynamic simulation, a number of works contribute on finding optimal tolling when 
toll is variable by time-step (third-best) or toll is aimed to maintain no-queue traffic flow (de 
Palma, Kilani et al., 2005; de Palma, Lindsey et al., 2008). 
Joint analysis of route guidance and congestion pricing 
In spite of the numerous works that addressed “traffic information” or “congestion pricing” on 
a separate basis, there have been few contributions on the interplay between traffic 
information services and congestion pricing. Let us quote nevertheless the works of Verhoef, 
Emmerink et al. (1996); de Palma and Lindsey (1998); Yang (1999); Zhang and Verhoef 
(2006), only to mention that they pay no consideration to exogenous disturbances - the 
reason for what dynamic information services have been developed. 
Network Optimization with Dynamic Traffic Information and Tolling 
LEURENT Fabien, NGUYEN Thai Phu  
 
12th WCTR, July 11-15, 2010 – Lisbon, Portugal 
 
5 
 
Recently, Fernández, de Cea et al. (2009) attempted to analyze the joint effects of traffic 
information and congestion pricing in presence of traffic disturbances. However, the 
representation of disturbances in this modelling framework is limited to a set of four 
alternative traffic conditions. 
1.3. Paper scope 
Objective 
In a previous work (Leurent and Nguyen, 2008, 2010), the interplays between recurrent 
congestion, non-recurrent congestion and dynamic traffic information were explicitly modeled 
by segmenting travel demand into two classes of users respectively informed or not: the 
informed users have dynamic traffic information about the actual travel time conditions, 
whereas the non-informed users only know about the average travel times. This is a novel 
assignment model since it distinguishes two layers of user equilibrium in traffic, associated 
with two time scales in demand perception and behavior: an upper layer of short run 
decision-making by informed users as opposed to a lower level of long run decision-making 
by uninformed users, each layer constraining the other. 
 
The main purpose of this paper is to develop an extension of the basic model integrating 
various tolling strategies. The extended model allows analyzing the impacts of dynamic traffic 
information and congestion pricing on traffic as well as splitting individual effects and joint 
effects from each of these demand management tools. Rather than trying to quantify the 
costs and profits of a particular system, our focus is on a crucial assumption which has yet 
been mis-modeled in the evaluation of traffic information systems: namely, the probabilistic 
structure of dynamic disruptions. 
Approach 
Our philosophy, throughout a number of works on the issue of traveler information, is explicit 
and realistic enough in these respects, yet as simple as possible without distorting the physic 
and behavioral features. Our model makes explicit assumptions about: (i) network; (ii) traffic 
conditions subject to the phenomena of congestion; (iii) statistical distribution of 
disturbances; (iv) demand structure consisting of volume, classes of users (informed or non-
informed), equipment rate. The individual traffic information device enables the informed user 
to know about disturbed travel costs while the non-informed user perceives only average 
travel costs owning to his experience from previous trips. 
 
Then, the modeling framework will be adapted for various tolling strategy, in particular flat-
tolling strategy in which toll is fixed for all circumstances and dynamic-tolling strategy in 
which an optimal toll is designed and tailored to the vary circumstance. The combination of 
three tolling options (no-tolling, flat-tolling and dynamic-tolling) and two information diffusion 
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options (with or without dynamic information) makes a set of six management schemes to be 
compared. 
 
The model is applied to a classroom network of two parallel links, with two classes of users 
respectively informed or not, in order to simulate the response to disturbances of travelers 
and the design of traffic management schemes and to evaluate the profit from traffic 
management tools. 
Structure of the paper 
Section §2 will set up the modeling framework by recalling the main assumptions and adding 
a tolling component, including toll variables and tolling strategies, to the basic model 
presented in (Leurent and Nguyen, 2008, 2010). This setting will bring us to various traffic 
equilibrium assignment problems which depend on the specified tolling strategy. Since the 
assignment problem is the same at that in the basic model under no-tolling strategy, section 
§3 will recall the main steps of the equilibrium analysis which end up with some analytical 
formulae. Section §4 starts by defining the optimal flat toll and then attempts to convert the 
new traffic equilibrium assignment problems, including flat-tolling strategy, to a traditional 
user equilibrium problem solved previously. In the same logic, section §5 starts by defining 
the optimal dynamic-toll. In fact, the traffic equilibrium assignment problem under dynamic 
tolling strategy is identical to a system optimum assignment problem which was solved by 
Leurent and Nguyen (2009). The traffic equilibrium analysis carried out in sections §3,4,5 
allows us doing some analytical comparisons as well as some numerical investigations in 
section §6.  
2. THE BI-LAYER EQUILIBRIUM MODEL 
The model will be presented through a set of modelling assumptions that pertain to, 
respectively: (i) the supply side of the network and its routes, with the local travel times, 
congestion effects and random disturbances; (ii) different tolling scenarios; (iii) the demand 
side of the trip-makers whether equipped or non-equipped with a device for dynamic 
information; (iv) the interaction of supply, demand, toll and information. 
2.1. Supply-side assumption 
 
Figure 1 – Two-parallel-link network with one OD relation 
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Let us consider a transport network made up of arcs Aa ∈  the arc set, with endpoints 
Nn ∈  the node set. Our application here is restricted to a classroom case of two parallel 
arcs linking an origin node to a destination node, as in Figure 1: hence }2,1{∈a . 
 
On each network arc a , the arc flow ax  induces an individual travel time of aT  which is 
subject to congestion effects on the basis of a travel time function )(~ aaa xtT = , an increasing 
function of the arc flow. For instance let us take a linear affine function as follows, 
aaaaa xxt γ+α=)(~  in which aα  denotes a free-flow travel time and aγ  the sensitivity of the 
individual time to the flow (see Figure 2a). This assumption is consistent with the un-queued 
state of traffic, not with the queued state in which the flow is constrained by a flowing 
capacity. 
 
Despite our flow-based model is basically a stationary model, we shall consider dynamic 
effects from period to period, i.e. inter-period variability to be modeled by a random variable 
(see Figure 2b). To that end, we assume that there is a set Ω  of circumstances (or periods) 
ω , each of which has arc flow ωax  and arc travel time: 
 )()(~ ωζ+= ωω aaaa xtT  (1) 
 
aα
aγ
at
ax
a
a
a
a
a
x
x
γ+
α
=)(t~
 
Figure 2 – (a) Travel time-flow function; and (b) Link disturbance distribution 
The random variable )(ωζa  models the eventual variation in travel time that may arise due 
to exogenous disturbances. It is assumed to have variance of 2aσ  and null mean. For 
simplicity, it can be assumed that the variables )(ωζa  are independently distributed. 
We have the formula of the average travel time over all occurrences: 
 )(~]:[E xtxxT aaa ==ωωω  (2) 
2.2. Tolling strategies 
At a given occurrence ω , on link a, a toll ωap  (for simplicity, ωap  is supposed to be converted 
into time units) computed by the network operator according to traffic conditions under one of 
the following tolling strategies: 
 No-tolling strategy, denoted NT: toll ωap  on link a is set at 0 (null) for every link every 
occurrence. 
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 Flat-tolling strategy, denoted FT: ωap  does not depend on occurrence ω : 
ω∀=ω aa pp . The value ap  is set in order to maximize the average social welfare 
over all occurrences ω . 
 Dynamic-tolling strategy, denoted DT: ωap  is variable with respect to occurrence ω . 
For each occurrence ω , ωap  is set in order to maximize the social welfare for that 
occurrence. 
2.3. Demand-side assumption 
Let us analyze the network trips by origin-destination (OD) pair, e.g. from node O to node D, 
presented in Figure 1. The trips are made on an OD pair by a population of network users 
who fall into one out of two classes: either class I  of equipped users who have got a device 
to receive dynamic information, or class N  of the non-equipped users that do not receive 
dynamic information. 
 
Every user is assumed to be homogenous in value of time and to choose his network route 
from origin to destination under a rational behavior of cost minimization, subject to his 
knowledge of the costs. 
 
An informed user I is assumed to derive perfect knowledge from dynamic information 
whatever the circumstance, including travel time and toll: 
 ωωω +==ω aaa
I
a pTCc )(  (3) 
 
While a non-informed user N is assumed to possess only coarse knowledge on the basis of 
the average travel time and average toll: 
 aaaa
N
a CCpTc ==+= ωωωωω ][E][E  (4) 
 
Here the user cost is restricted to the travel time and travel time-equivalent-unit toll, 
neglecting comfort and other quality criteria in order to focus on the disturbances which make 
our primary concern. 
 
Let us denote by 21 xxQ +=  the non-elastic total demand volume, assumed constant 
whatever the circumstance. Let Qq I /=β  denote the equipment rate i.e. the ratio of the 
number of informed users, Iq , to Q , and let IN qQq −= be the number of non-informed 
users. By arc a , occurrence ω  and user class },{ NIu ∈ , )(ωuax  denotes the flow on arc a : 
it holds that: 
 





=ω+ω
=ω+ω
ω+ω=ω
NNN
III
N
a
I
aa
qxx
qxx
xxx
)()(
)()(
)()()(
21
21   (5) 
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2.4. Interaction supply-demand 
Let us chain the assumptions about supply and demand in the following statement: 
 In any occurrence ω , every network user chooses his route: his travel along that 
route makes a piece of flow. 
 Considering the population of trip-makers, their individual choices induce the arc 
flows throughout the network. 
 The arc flows determine the arc travel times on the basis of the congestion functions. 
 The travel times determine the individual route choice. 
Thus there is a cyclical chaining in the interaction of supply and demand. Figure 3 makes the 
statement more precise by addressing each user class in a specific way: a class I  user 
reacts to any particular occurrence ω  by adapting his route choice to the dynamic context – 
thus leading to )(ωIax  flows that vary with ω  hence in the short run, while a class N  user 
makes his route choice only in the long run on the basis of the route performance averaged 
over the distribution Ω  of cases ω , leading to Nax  flows that do not vary with respect to ω . 
Toll ωap  is computed on the basis of traffic conditions and of the tolling chosen tolling 
strategy. 
 
 
Figure 3: Logic dependencies in the model 
Occurrence ω : 
gross disturbance 
ζ  
Informed flow 
I
ax ω  
Objective disturbed travel cost: 
ωω + aa pT  
Average link travel cost: 
][E ωωω + aa pT  Uninformed flow: N
ax  
Equilibrium assignment 
of class N 
Toll  ωap  
Equilibrium assignment 
of class I 
Network 
performance 
Tolling strategy of 
the network operator 
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3.5. Indicators of utility 
Two economic indicators are chosen for analyzing (i) the individual benefit that a road user 
derives from a personal traffic information device and (ii) the social benefit of the whole 
system, including dynamic traffic information and congestion pricing system. 
Individual gain of being equipped 
The individual gain of being equipped is measured by the gap between the average travel 
cost (per trip) to non-informed user NC and the average travel cost (per trip) to informed user 
IC : 
 
INP CC −=Γ  (6) 
, in which P denote the specific toll strategy in the analysis. 
 
To a non-equipped user of non-informed class N, the average cost is as follows (because the 
assignment of this class does not depend on ω ): 
 N
N
N
N
N
NN
q
x
c
q
x
cC 2211 +=  (7) 
To an equipped user of class I , the average cost stems from the aggregation of all 
occurrence costs: 
 ∫
ω
ωωωω ω+= dCxCxC III )( 2211  (8) 
Average travel time per trip undergone by all network users 
The social welfare of the whole traffic can be represented by the average travel time per trip 
undergone by all network users. This average travel time stems from the aggregation of all 
occurrence travel times: 
 ∫
ω
ωωωω ω+= dTxTxT P )( 2211  (9) 
Note that this indicator does not include toll since toll, which is transferred from users to the 
network operator, is not a social cost. 
3. NO-TOLLING STRATEGY 
Under no-tolling strategy, the assignment problem stays a bi-layer user equilibrium problem, 
denoted, which is treated in (Leurent and Nguyen, 2008, 2010). This section presents only 
the main steps of the equilibrium analysis which follow the logical structure in Figure 3. We 
shall first assume a given assignment of the non-informed class and focus on the assignment 
of the informed class. The average assignment of the informed class (§3.2) will be 
aggregated from its occurrence assignments (§3.1) over all occurrences ω. Next, the non-
informed class will be assigned conditionally on the informed class. Then, the assignment 
cycle will form the bi-layer equilibrium as a fixed-point problem (§3.4). Lastly, two economic 
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indicators will be proposed for analysing the effects of dynamic information and congestion 
pricing on the traffic network (§3.5). 
3.1. Occurrence assignment of informed users 
Let Naaa
I
a xγ+α=α  : then ωω ζ+ωγ+α= aIaaIaa xT )(  is the case travel time of arc a  under 
occurrence ω . If there were only one informed user, he would choose the route of 
minimum ωω ζ+α= aIaaT )0( . However the dynamic reassignment of informed users will tend 
to increase the travel time of that route due to its congestion function: this effect may yield 
partial compensation i.e. ωaT  remains less than ωbT , or total compensation i.e. 
 ωω ζ+ωγ+α=ζ+ωγ+α bIbbIbaIaaIa xx )()(  (10) 
In the latter case, since IIb
I
a qxx =ω+ω )()(  it holds that: 
 
ba
a
I
ab
I
b
I
bI
a
q
x
γ+γ
ζ−α−ζ+α+γ
=ω)(  (11) 
 
ba
baab
ba
I
ab
I
ba
I
ba
a
qT
γ+γ
ζγ+ζγ
+
γ+γ
αγ+αγ+γγ
=ω  (12) 
In the former case, IIa qx =ω  and 0=ωIbx , hence ωω ζ+γ+α= aIaIaa qT  and ωω ζ+α= bIbbT , 
with ωω ≤ ba TT  hence: 
 
I
a
I
b
I
aab qγ+α−α≥ζ−ζ ωω  (13) 
3.2. Conditional and average assignment of informed users 
Let III q121B γ+α−α≡  and III q221A γ−α−α≡  : conditional on 12 ζ−ζ=z  it holds that  
 if B>z  then )0()( 21 ωω ≤ TqT I  hence II qx =ω)(1  and 0)(2 =ωIx  
 if A<z  then )()0( 21 IqTT ωω ≥  hence 0)(1 =ωIx  and II qx =ω)(2  
 if B][A,∈z  then ωω = 21 TT  at flows 
21
1
A)(
γ+γ
−
=ω
z
x I  and 
21
2
B)(
γ+γ
−
=ω
z
x I . 
Denoting by F the distribution function of 12 ζ−ζ=Z  over the set Ω of cases ω, and by F~  
the truncated moment function ∫=
x
zzx )dF()(F~ , by aggregation 
 
IIII xqzqzzzx 2
B
B
A 21
A
1 )dF(.)dF(A)dF(.0 −=+γ+γ
−
+= ∫∫∫
+∞
∞−
 (14) 
 in which: 
 
21
2
G(A)G(B)
γ+γ
−
=
Ix  where )(F~)F()G( xxxx −≡  (15) 
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The independence of 1ζ  and 2ζ  makes Z randomly distributed with mean value 
012 =µ−µ=µ  and variance 22212 σ+σ=σ  
3.3 Assignment of non-informed users 
Let Iaaaa
N
a xγ+µ+α≡α  and compare N1α  with N2α  : 
 if NNN q221 γ+α≥α  then NN qx =2  and 01 =Nx  
 if NNN q 211 α≤γ+α  then NN qx =1  and 02 =Nx  
 if NNNN qq 2121 γ≤α−α≤γ−  then 
ba
N
b
N
a
N
bN
a
q
x
γ+γ
γ+α−α
=  
The last condition stems from θ== ba tt  with NaaIaaaa xxt γ+γ+α= , when the assignment 
of non-informed users to the routes of minimal cost subject to the congestion functions yields 
a traffic equilibrium with equilibrium time of θ. 
3.4. Fixed-point Characterization of Supply-Demand Equilibrium 
Linking together the previous formulae, we obtain that the non-informed flows )( Nax  induce 
the reference informed travel times )( Iaα , which in turn determine the average informed 
flows )( Iax , which in turn determine the reference non-informed travel times )( Naα , which in 
turn determine the non-informed flows )( Nax . This cycle states that any variable set out of 
)( Nax , )( Iax , )( Iaα , )( Naα  solves a specific problem of fixed point. In the two-link case that 
kind of problem is easy to solve since it involves only one real unknown; a relaxation 
algorithm would be appropriate, for instance a convex combination algorithm in the non-
informed flows. 
3.5. Case of average link cost equality 
For the case of equal average link costs (the most popular case, see Leurent and Nguyen 
(2008, 2010)). The indicators can be formulated analytically: 
 The individual gain of being equipped 
 )..G( .
2
1 QNT βγ−=Γ  (16) 
, in which: γ  is the sum of sensitivity-to-congestion parameters: 21 γ+γ≡γ . 
 The average travel time (per trip) undergone by all users amounts to: 
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 )..G(.T .
2
1 QNT βγ−β−θ=  (17) 
, in which 
21
122121
γ+γ
γα+γα+γγ
≡θ Q  
4. FLAT-TOLLING STRATEGY 
4.1. Optimal flat toll 
Under flat-toll strategy, denoted FT, toll rates are invariable with regard to ω : ω∀=ω aa pp . 
ap  is set in order to minimize the average travel time (per trip) of all users: 
 [ ]FT
pa
Tmin  (18) 
ap  will be calculated in the procedure of traffic assignment (sub-section §4.2) when FTT is 
explicitly formulated. 
4.2. Traffic assignment 
Assuming that the ap  are known, we will search a solution to the traffic assignment problem. 
When the traffic assignment and the indicators are formulated, the average travel time per 
trip FTT  can be used as an objective function to determine ap . 
 
Under fixed ap , the the link travel cost function becomes: 
 ωωωω γ++α=+= aaaaaaa xppTC  (19) 
Denoting aaa p+α=α* , the formula can be rewritten as: 
 ωω γ+α= aaaa xC *  (20) 
 
The traffic assignment problem becomes a traditional traffic assignment problem as in 
section §3 when the demand with volume Q and equipment rate β  is assigned to a network 
with parameter set: aa γα ,*  (instead of aa γα , ) 
4.3. Case of average link cost equality 
For the case of equal average link costs, the indicators can be formulated analytically as 
below: 
 The individual gain of being equipped: 
 [ ]QFT ...G 21 βγ−=Γ  (21) 
 The average travel time (per trip) undergone by all users amounts to: 
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 ]..[)..G(. 2211* .2
1 pQ
xpQ
xQT FT +−βγ−β−θ=  (22) 
, in which: 
21
12221121 )()(
*
γ+γ
γ+α+γ+α+γγ
≡θ ppQ  
Since 21 CC = , the formula of FTT  can be reduced to: 
 )(1)..G(. .
2
1 α∆+∆∆
γ
+βγ−β−θ= ppQQT
FT
 (23) 
, in which: 12 ppp −=∆  and 12 α−α≡α∆  
Let us consider FTT  as a function of a unique variable p∆ . p∆ must be set at 
2
α∆
−  for 
FTT to be minimal. At this state: 
 )..G(.
..4
.
2
1
2
QQT
FT βγ−β−
γ
α∆
−θ=  (24) 
5. DYNAMIC-TOLLING STRATEGY 
5.1. Optimal dynamic toll 
Under dynamic-tolling strategy, toll ωap  are set in order to minimize the total travel time 
undergone all user at the occurrence ω : 
 
[ ]2211min ωωωω +
ω
TxTx
ap
 (25) 
 
In the literature, it is well-known that: traffic assignment can achieve system optimum if “user 
is charged so that travel cost reflects the marginal social cost in term of impact on others”. 
e.g. link travel cost introduced in (3) should amount to: 
 
ω
ω
ωω +=
a
a
aa dx
dTTC  (26) 
In the other word, toll on link a at occurrence ω  must be set to: 
 
ω
ωω =
a
a
aa dx
td
xp
~
 (27) 
At this state, the traffic assignment problem coincide with a bi-layer system optimum 
assignment as addressed in (Leurent and Nguyen 2009). 
5.2. System optimum traffic assignment 
Thanks to the linear assumption in travel time function, the formula (25) can be rewriten as: 
ωω γ= aaa xp . . The link travel cost function becomes: 
 aaaaaaaaaaa xxpTC ζ+γ+α=ζ+γ+α=+= ωωωωω #2  (28) 
, in which aa γ=γ 2# . 
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The traffic assignment problem becomes a traditional traffic assignment problem presented 
in section §3 when the demand with volume Q and equipment rate β  is assigned into a 
network of the parameter set: #, aa γα  (instead of aa γα , ). 
 
By replacing aγ2 by #aγ , this assignment problem is identical to the bi-layer user equilibrium 
assignment presented in §3. This assignment problem called system optimum assignment is 
also treated in (Leurent and Nguyen 2009). 
5.3. Case of link cost equality 
For the case of equality of average link cost, the indicators can be formulated analytically as 
below: 
 The individual gain of being equipped: 
 [ ]QDT ..G βγ−=Γ  (29) 
 The average travel time (per trip) undergone by all users amounts to: 








γ
α∆
−βγ−β−θ= βγ−−βγ−β+βγ−−
γ
σ
− )]...
2
1G()..G(.
2
1[)]..F(
2
1[
..2
2
.
2
1
..4
)..G(.
2
QQQQQQT
DT
 (30) 
6. COMPARING DIFFERENT MANAGEMENT SCHEMES 
In the three previous sections, the analytical formulae of average travel cost per trip 
undergone by all users are identified. The comparison of the different tolling strategies start 
with a setting of management scheme (§6.1), then an analytical comparison (§6.2) and  a 
numerical investigation (§6.3) will enable us to gain a better understanding, in particular on 
the sensitivity of the effects with regard to network configuration or to information diffusion 
level. 
6.1. Traffic management schemes 
The combination of two options with regard to dynamic traffic information and three options 
with regard to congestion pricing makes totally six available management schemes: 
 
Table 1 – Management schemes by combining dynamic information and congestion pricing 
Information 
Congestion pricing 
Without 
dynamic information 
With 
dynamic information 
No-toll (1) (2) 
Flat-toll (3) (4) 
Dynamic-toll (5) (6) 
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6.2. Analysis 
Under the assumption of equal average travel costs, the average travel time per trip without 
any regulation measure is θ . The benefit given by the traffic information service and the 
congestion pricing system at a tolling strategy P, is the different between θ  and PT . 
 
Under the no-tolling strategy, the benefit from dynamic traffic information is: )..G(. .
2
1 Qβγ−β  
which is a positive function of β . But it achieves its maximum at a relatively low value of β  
 
Under flat-tolling strategy and traffic information service, the benefit is )..G(.
4
.
2
2
1 QQ βγ−β+γ
α∆
 
which is composed of two parts: 
 The benefit from dynamic traffic information: )..G(. .
2
1 Qβγ−β  
 The benefit from flat tolling: Qγ
α∆
4
2
. 
Under dynamic-tolling and traffic information service, the benefit is still higher: 








+
γ
α∆
+βγ−β βγ−−βγ−β+βγ−−
γ
σ )]...
2
1G()..G(.
2
1[)]..F(
2
1[
..2
2
.
2
1
..4
)..G(.
2
QQQQQQ
 which can be 
divided into three parts:  
 The pure benefit from dynamic traffic information: )G(
2
1 Qγβ−β  which depends on 
network parameters, demand volume and equipment rate. 
 The pure benefit from congestion pricing (both flat and dynamic toll) 
Qγ
α∆
4
2
 which 
depends only on network parameters and the demand volume 
 The benefit from the joint operation of dynamic traffic information and congestion 
pricing: 








βγ−−βγ−β+βγ−−
γ
σ )]...
2
1G()..G(.
2
1[)]..F(
2
1[
..2
2
QQQQ
 which is a positive and 
increasing function of β . 
At the individual level, the gain of being equipped is identical under two strategies NT and 
FT: [ ]QFTNT ...G 21 βγ−=Γ=Γ  Under DT strategy, the gain of being equipped 
[ ]QDT ..G βγ−=Γ  is a somewhat lower than under the other strategies. 
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6.3. Numerical investigation 
Numerical setting 
We set up two configurations for a two link network: 
 “Motorway versus City Arterial” in which one route dominates the other in both link 
capacity and free flow link travel time. The numerical values of the parameters are set 
to 401 =α , 11 =γ  and 802 =α , 22 =γ . 
 “City Arterial versus City Road” in which each of the two routes has its own 
advantage either in capacity or free flow travel time. The numerical values of the 
parameters are set to 401 =α , 21 =γ  and 802 =α , 12 =γ . 
The random disturbances on link travel times are taken as independent, centred Gaussian 
variables, each one with variance of 2/2σ  to ensure that the difference variable 12 ζ−ζ=Z  
has variance 2σ . The value of σ  is set to 40, which supplies a link time with a relative 
dispersion of 2/ tσ  that decreases from 2/3 to 1/5 as the link flow increases. 
The travel demand Q  is varied from 5 to 150 by step of 5 in order to examine a range of 
traffic conditions. The equipment rate β  is varied from 0% to 100% by increment of 1%. 
 
Low travel demand condition 
The average travel time per trip undergone by all users over all occurrences is representative 
to the social welfare of the system. At low travel demand Q=10 (Figure 4), dynamic traffic 
information contributes significantly to improve network performance. However, congestion 
pricing has no impact to the system. It is quite logic since congestion pricing is not needed if 
traffic conditions are not congested. 
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Figure 4 - Average travel time per trip at high demand Q=10 under different management schemes 
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High travel demand condition 
More interesting the in the case with high travel demand, Q=100, depicted in Figure 5. The 
effects of demand management on the average travel time per trip are much more 
significant. 
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Figure 5 – Average travel time per trip at high demand Q=100 under different management schemes 
The difference between the top line (1) and the continuous black line (2) represents the pure 
value of selfish dynamic traffic information (only dynamic information). An exciting point must 
be remarked is that the benefit from dynamic information achieves its maximum at a 
relatively low value of equipment rate. 
 
The difference between the continuous black line (2) and the continuous blue line (4), as well 
as between the top line (1) and the dash blue line (3,5) represents the pure value of 
congestion pricing (only congestion pricing). It is constant with regard to the equipment rate. 
 
The difference between the continuous red line (6) and the continuous blue line (4) 
represents the benefit from the dynamic synchronisation between two demand management 
tolls. This benefit increases with respect to the equipment rate. 
7. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, the effects of dynamic traffic information and of congestion pricing are jointly 
modeled with the presence of recurrent and non-recurrent congestion. The benefits from the 
two management tolls are formulated analytically. Further, analytical formulae allow us slit 
the total benefit to different benefit components: the pure benefit from information, the pure 
benefit from congestion pricing and the benefit from the joint operation and the 
synchronization of the two management tolls. 
 
Apart from simplifying the network structure to two parallel links, our treatment is subject to 
several limitations. First, recurrent congestion is modelled in a static way by assuming that 
the link travel time is a linear function of the link volume: this corresponds to the light-to-
medium range of congestion effects, not to the medium-to-severe range. Second, the 
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dynamic disruptions in link travel times are modelled as random variables, involving specific 
assumptions of, respectively: (i) independence between the two links; (ii) Gaussian 
distribution; (iii) homosketasticity. It is easy to deal with dependency and heteroskedasticity 
under the Gaussian assumption, by specific adaptation of the difference in link travel times, 
our Z  variable. Furthermore, the Gaussian assumption was shown not to differ significantly 
from the assumption of Bernoulli-Exponential disturbances by network link if the property of a 
symmetric distribution is maintained for the Z  variable. 
 
Further work about our model and the associated economic analysis may be targeted at the 
following topics: 
 Numerical investigation of dependent, heteroskedastic disturbances, for instance in 
the case of Bernoulli-Exponential variables. 
 Analytical study of the interplay of congestion recurrent and incidental, DTO and 
capacity management. 
 Analytical study of the interplay of congestion recurrent and incidental, DTO and toll 
setting, in order to asses the complementariness and eventual redundancy of the two 
tools to improve on the system state. 
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